Pensar: el trabajo fenomenológico-hermenéutico. A propósito de las primeras líneas de Carta sobre el “humanismo” de Heidegger

This paper aims to read line by line the beginning of the Letter on “humanism” in order to defend, on the one hand, the Heideggerian commitment to the phenomenological attitude in spite of the fact that he no longer uses most of the technical term coined by Husserl and that this is, moreover, hermeneutic at all times; and, on the other hand, that the interpretation of this text must be achieved, precisely, by committing oneself to this attitude. In the same way, we will defend that the hermeneutical-phenomenological attitude and exercise appears as a decision regarding how to face the question of our own historical time, why our normal behaviour in our historical situation consist of, that this decision is only understandable from this very exercise and that the term “thinking” shows that, from 1930 onwards, it means this very exercise.Este trabajo pretende leer línea a línea el comienzo de Carta sobre el “humanismo” para defender, por un lado, el compromiso heideggeriano con la actitud fenomenológica a pesar del abandono de la mayoría de los términos técnicos acuñados por Husserl y de que este sea, además, hermenéutico en todo momento; y, por otro lado, que la interpretación de este texto debe llevarse a cabo, precisamente, comprometiéndose con esa actitud. En esta línea, defenderemos que la actitud y el ejercicio fenomenológico-hermenéutico aparece como una decisión frente a cómo afrontar la pregunta por nuestro propio tiempo histórico, por en qué consiste nuestro normal andar con las cosas en nuestra situación histórica, que esa decisión solo es comprensible desde ese ejercicio y que el término “pensar” demuestra significar, a partir de 1930, ese ejercicio mismo.This paper aims to read line by line the beginning of the Letter on “humanism” in order to defend, on the one hand, the Heideggerian commitment to the phenomenological attitude in spite of the fact that he no longer uses most of the technical term coined by Husserl and that this is, moreover, hermeneutic at all times; and, on the other hand, that the interpretation of this text must be achieved, precisely, by com-mitting oneself to this attitude. In the same way, we will defend that the hermeneutical-phenomenological attitude and exercise appears as a decision regarding how to face the question of our own historical time, why our normal behaviour in our historical situation consist of, that this decision is only understandable from this very exercise and that the term “thinking” shows that, from 1930 onwards, it means this very exercis